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BOOK REVIEWS
KAREN ANN QUINLAN: DYING IN THE AGE OF ETERNAL
LIFE by B. D. COLEN. New York: Nash Publishing. Index. 1976.
Pp. 204. $7.95 cloth.
DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION:
OUR LAST QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY by ROBERT M.
VEATCH.

New Haven and London: Yale University Press. Biblio.,

index. 1976. Pp. ix + 323. $12.95 cloth.

Joan A. Lang* and Marc M. Seltzer**
(I)n saving Karen Ann Quinlan, a group of well-meaning
physicians created a modern Frankenstein's monster. For they
took the near lifeless body of a young woman and, rather than
leaving her to herself in order that "the slight spark of life which
[they] had communicated would fade, that this thing which
had received such imperfect animation would subside into dead
matter," they.

. . worked

against all odds and the wishes of the

Quinlan family for more than a year. And what they worked so
hard to save was a monster .

. .

.

From the Age of Enlightenment until recent times, the dream
of achieving dominion over nature and conquering disease and
other natural calamities by the application of technology has
seemed to come nearer to realization with each breakthrough in
science. The mechanical wonders that fill this century would
have astonished our ancestors. One dream, that of conquering
death itself, is wonderfully depicted in Mary Shelley's tale of
Frankensteinin which Dr. Frankenstein is blinded by pride in the
abilities of his science. Believing that he could master the processes of life and death, and falsely confident that he could control his creation, he unleashed a monster.
B. D. Colen and Robert M. Veatch express trepidation about
* M.D., 1968 University of Chicago. Dr. Lang is in private practice in Los Angeles,
California.
* * J.D., 1972 University of California at Los Angeles; associate, Corinblit & Shapero,

in Los Angeles, California.
1. B. D. COLEN, KAREN

ANN QUINLAN: DYING IN THE AGE OF ETERNAL

LIFE 71 (1976)

[hereinafter cited as COLEN] (paraphrased from Mary Wollstonecraft Shelley's introduction to her novel Frankenstein).
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the "monsters" that may be unleashed by modern medical technology. Their works are part of a growing body of literature concerned with the impact of medical technology on the condition of
life in its final stages. Colen and Veatch consider the particular
circumstances and implications of the Karen Ann Quinlan case.
Her saga is known to most of us, for it became, for a time, a cause
celebre. According to our bent, we were enthralled by the personal
and family tragedy, intrigued by the legal issues, or perplexed by
the moral and philosophical issues which her case dramatized.
However, the importance of the issues raised by the Quinlan case
transcends the story of her life and death. Both authors seek to
place In re Quinlan' in a wider context and to make us aware of
other troubling cases resulting from recent advances in biomedical technology.
Thus, Colen and Veatch ask us to consider a variety of vexing
problems: the badly crippled accident victim in a deep coma, the
terminally ill cancer patient lingering in great pain, the newborn
baby with severe birth defects, and other problems exacerbated
by our new-found ability to prolong life. Typical questions which
they present are:
1) What are the legal and moral responsibilities of the
attending physician treating a patient in deep and irreversible coma? Should he or she do all within his or her power
to sustain heart beat and respiration for as long as possible, regardless of the patient's capacity to regain
consciousness?
2) What are the legal and moral rights and privileges
of the patient? May a competent patient in his or her sole
discretion determine what further treatment should be
discontinued when such treatment is essential to sustain
life?
3) What are the legal and moral rights and responsibilities of the patient's family and society at large? May
family members or court-appointed guardians determine
that further treatment is to be discontinued for a hopelessly comatose patient?
4) When should a patient be deemed "dead"?
2. 137 N.J. Super. 227, 348 A.2d 801 (1975).
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The last is perhaps the most surprising of the questions we are
asked to consider. Not so very long ago death seemed relatively
simple, in practice if not in theory. Assaulted by any of a variety
of illnesses or injuries, a person's heart stopped beating,
breathing ceased, and perhaps with a symbolically significant
"last gasp," the body grew still and cold. The person was dead,
and no great skill was required to know it.
Advances in medical technology have changed this, at least for
those living in the technologically developed Western nations.
Once-stilled hearts can be jolted into starting again; a machine
can be supplied to do the breathing. What once seemed miraculous is now routine. The constant narrowing of the kinds of therapies considered "extraordinary" as opposed to "ordinary," and
the difficulty of drawing any "bright line" between them, evidence the rapid pace at which the biomedical revolution is proceeding.
Often, the results do seem miraculous. Human beings, even
with medical histories that resemble Karen's, or worse, are saved
from what would have once been certain death, and returned to
normal or at least acceptably limited lives. But, inevitably, there
are failures. The "best" failures, many feel, are those who die.
The real problems-emotionally, morally, legally, and economically-are the partial failures-or partial successes, depending on
one's viewpoint. These are the cases like Karen Ann Quinlan.
Legally, Karen Quinlan still lives. Colen and Veatch ask us to
consider, however, what that means in light of the ability of modem science to sustain indefinitely the traditional "vital signs." Is
that human shape which Colen calls a "monster," and which
even her doctors describe as a "brain-stem preparation" and
''grotesque," still a "human being" named Karen? Her parents
are themselves desperately confused about this, judging from a
fascinating conversation related in Colen's book.' They speak of
her in the past tense at times, even refer to her as a "vegetable,"
yet continue to visit her twice daily. They have fought passionately to disconnect her from the machine which breathes for her,
but would not dream of disconnecting her from the tube which
supplies her nourishment. They fought for the right to direct her
3. COLEN, supra note 1, at 29-43.
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doctors to turn off her respirator, but both said they would also
fight to avoid having to turn it off themselves. The issues are
murky, and the principles to guide their resolution are unclear or
in conflict. Distinctions which seem crucial to one person seem
irrelevant to another.
The only thing beyond dispute is that the issues are complex
and that we cannot reasonably expect to find simple answers. Yet
neither can we afford to muddle along without answers, for technology innovates so much faster than we can muddle that the gap
would only grow wider. It is to the credit of both Colen and
Veatch that they urge us not to succumb to the temptation to
avoid the unpleasant and the difficult. As Roderic Gorney cogently observes in his book The Human Agenda:
Up to now the rate of change in our lives has been slow enough
to permit the processes of evolution of values to remain automatic and therefore largely unconscious. Today the rate of
change we now produce in the condition of our lives is too swift
for the processes of spontaneous evolution of values to keep up.
For the first time in two million years we must learn to exercise
a new freedom-the option to choose our values consciously.
But no one today is equipped for such responsibility ...
Today it has become impossible for any mind to encompass the
available knowledge, while ironically it is becoming indispensable for every mind to do so. The time when we could leave our
survival to specialists is past. The responsibilities of citizenship
• . . require us all to be competent generalists.'
The Veatch book admirably serves this goal by addressing in
an engaging way the principal medical, legal, moral, and philosophical issues raised by the impact of the "biomedical revolution" on our lives and deaths.
While Veatch and Colen address many of the same issues, and
indeed argue for many of the same conclusions, their backgrounds
and their books are quite different. B. D. Colen is a journalist,
and in fact, according to the dust cover of his book, is the
Washington Post reporter who "broke the story" of the Quinlan
case. He has specialized in medical feature writing and bioethics
and was nominated for a Pulitzer Prize for reporting on the
4. R. GORNEY, THE HUMAN AGENDA 9 (1972).
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Quinlan case. His book, billed as "both a case history and a
thorough examination of the larger public issue it represents,"
employs newspaper-style interviews and vignettes taken from
several cases, including Quinlan, to dramatize his theses. Colen
suggests that "Karen Ann's physicians insisted upon making her
a prisoner of medical technology," 5 that this is an increasingly
common dilemma today, requiring our immediate attention,' and
that it is our obligation to recognize the inevitability of death and
to learn to care better for the dying.
Robert M. Veatch, on the other hand, is a scholar. Holding a
B.S. from Purdue, an M.S. in Pharmacology from the University
of California Medical Center, a B.D. from Harvard Divinity
School, and an M.A. and Ph.D. in Religion and Society from
Harvard where he specialized in medical ethics, he has been for
several years Director of the Research Group on Death and Dying
of the Institute of Society Ethics and the Life Sciences. His ideas
on the social and ethical problems of death and dying and on the
rights and responsibilities of being human, therefore, have taken
shape over years of research, debate, and writing. His book impressively reflects this background.
The Quinlan case provides the impetus and the context for
Colen's exploration of the issues of life- or death-prolonging decisions; for Veatch, the case, one of many analyzed, falls into place
as one which provided public exposure to issues with which he
evidently has long been concerned. His concern is "our struggle
for freedom and justice in a world increasingly moved by a technological priesthood who can lead us simultaneously to salvation
and damnation."7 He wants "to probe the new social and ethical
problems of death and dying that have been generated by those
revolutions." 8 He brings to bear a wealth of interdisciplinary
learning and helps to clarify many of these complex issues that
inhabit a still largely uncharted landscape.
Both Veatch and Colen provide a large number of short descriptions of cases similar to the Quinlan case which serve as an
5. COLEN, supra note 1, at 11.
6. Id. at 12.
7. R. VEATCH, DEATH, DYING AND THE BIOLOGICAL REVOLUTION: OUR LAST QUEST FOR
RESPONSIBILITY 18 (1976) [hereinafter cited as VEATCH].
8. Id.
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introduction to these problems. The value of these examples for
the general reader lies perhaps most importantly in providing a
glimpse of what is, to many, an entirely alien environment, the
strange twilight world in which the badly injured or deformed
keep a slender hold on life, sustained by the artifices of modern
technology.
The Colen book is a popular account which may stimulate the
interest of those who, through newspaper reports, are somewhat
familiar with the issues and dilemmas existing at the frontiers of
medical treatment. However, its lack of bibliography or crossreferences to the growing literature in this field diminishes its
usefulness as a starting point for further inquiry. By contrast, the
Veatch book contains many references to this literature, and due
to its thorough and comprehensive approach may serve as a starting point for further exploration.
Both Colen and Veatch consider the circumstances in which
medical treatment may be withheld or withdrawn in the light of
the legal and ethical responsibilities and rights of physicians,
patients, and their families. Both authors comment critically on
the limits placed upon the freedom of action (and inaction) of
patients and their physicians by legal rules and by the "chilling
effect" of the law's uncertainty. For Colen, these limitations are
impediments to sane and human accommodations to these highly
personal tragedies, and he expresses understandable, though confused, frustration with the sluggishness of legal reform and the
imperfections of the law. Colen insists that the Quinlan case is
no case at all, meaning that situations like Karen Ann Quinlan's
do not belong in the courts, but should be handled extrajudicially.1 Veatch, by contrast, proposes elaborate legislation aimed
at improving the present archaic and ambiguous state of the law.
9. In In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1010, 1015-18
(D.C. Cir. 1964), views similar to those of Colen were expressed by Circuit Judge (now
Chief Justice) Burger. Judge J. Skelley Wright had ordered that a blood transfusion could
be given to an adult woman without her consent when the transfusion was necessary to
save her life. In re President and Directors of Georgetown College, Inc., 331 F.2d 1000
(D.C. Cir. 1964). She had objected to the transfusion on religious grounds. The court of
appeals denied a petition for a rehearing en banc of Judge Wright's decision. Judge Burger
urged that the court of appeals should have dismissed the petition on jurisdictional
grounds rather than merely deny the petition. In so doing, he expressed his view that such
cases are beyond the competency of courts of law.
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His proposals imply that the methods of social engineering can
at least ameliorate the difficulties that are the "unnatural" byproduct of advances in biomedical technology.
While Colen's plea for leaving the legal system out of the efforts
to resolve these difficult human situations may strike a sympathetic chord, it is naive. Legal rules will inevitably be applied to
some, if not all, such situations, either directly in the courts or
indirectly through their influence on the attitudes of participants.
Colen himself feels that one of the hidden reasons for seeking
judicial relief in the Quinlan case was to overcome the attending
physicians' resistance to acting in the face of their apprehension
of malpractice liability.1°
Additionally, there are deep and wide differences of opinion
among many persons and interest groups as to the proper role of
the doctor, patient, family, and courts in these situations. The
legal system is ideally situated to serve as the means of resolving
these differences in a rational and fair way. In the final analysis,
the legal system has an obligation to society at large to formulate
reasonable and intelligible rules which protect individuals from
the vagaries of arbitrary decision-making. Of course, we have not
yet approached that goal. There is much room for reform.
Law reform proposals touching upon the medical and ethical
dilemmas related to death and dying have mainly taken the form
of legislative action, such as California's Natural Death Act. Such
legislative responses have thus far seemed unsatisfactory." This
failure is perhaps understandable in view of the complexity of the
intense moral issues which lurk in the background of the legal
issues. The complexity of the moral issues is brought into particularly sharp focus by the question of whether there is a fundamental right under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States
Constitution to refuse medical treatment. The issue is both legal
and moral, because the resolution on the legal question depends
upon notions of a "higher law" which transcends the literal text
of the Constitution. As Veatch points out, the Quinlan case is
important for its recognition of a constitutional right to refuse
10. The New Jersey court specifically found that Dr. Morse's decision was indeed in
accord with and based on his conception of medical standards and practice and not a
result of concern over possible liability. In re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 259, 348 A.2d
801, 819 (1975).
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treatment. The far-reaching significance of this decision is that
such recognition would place fundamental limitations on the capacity of government, either legislatively or by judicial action, to
impose criminal or civil liability upon doctors who comply with
their patients' requests to stop further medical treatment.
The constitutional analysis in the Quinlan decision is based
upon a series of recent decisions by the United States Supreme
Court which recognize the existece of a fundamental right of privacy.'" Griswold v. Connecticut" and the Abortion Cases, Roe v.
Wade 4 and Doe v. Bolton,"5 illustrate the application of the socalled "due process-natural law" formula" for recognizing fundamental rights which are "implied" from explicit constitutional
guarantees and which cannot be abridged by government action
absent a showing of some compelling and legitimate countervailing state interest. The view that fundamental rights exist with
respect to the conduct of one's own life, including the right to
determine whether certain medical treatment shall be given, is
based on a demarcation between public and private life embodied
in the notion that "some types of choices ought to be remanded,
on principle, to private decision makers unchecked by substantive governmental control."' 7 The constitutional debate on these
issues reflects two countervailing social values: the protection of
personal autonomy and the interest of the state in protecting
citizens against themselves.
Both Colen and Veatch strongly adhere to the view that society
has no right to overrule the competent patient's decision to refuse
medical treatment. This view of the fundamental right of a person to exercise dominion over his own body, which is recognized
11. See Winslade, Thoughts on Technology and Death: An Appraisal of California's
Natural Death Act, 26 DEPAUL L. REv. 717 (1977).
12. The New Jersey Superior Court considered and rejected a claim of a right to refuse
treatment based on the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, 137 N.J. Super.
227, 267, 348 A.2d 801, 823 (1975), and the Eighth Amendment's proscription of cruel and
unusual punishment, 137 N.J. Super. 227, 269, 348 A.2d 801, 824 (1975).
13. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
14. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
15. 410 U.S. 179 (1973).
16. For a discussion of the development of this formula, see Adamson v. California, 332
U.S. 46, 80 (1947) (Black, J., dissenting).
17. Tribe, Foreword: Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87
HARV. L. REv. 1 (1973).
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in the Abortion Cases, is based on a view of personal liberty most
eloquently expressed by John Stuart Mill in his seminal essay, On
Liberty:
The only purpose for which power can rightly be exercised
over any member of a civilized community against his will is to
prevent harm to others."8
The Quinlan decision firmly endorses this principle.
Another aspect of the Quinlan decision that deserves comment
is the recognition of the right of third parties to assert the rights
of incompetent patients like Karen Ann Quinlan. Veatch, in particular, explores the intricacies of this controversial issue.
Beyond the legal issues, we cannot hope to understand or resolve the issues involved in death and dying without at least
attempting to penetrate our basic attitudes toward death. Many
thinkers, past and present, have addressed this problem, for
death is not, after all, anything new. Psychology and psychiatry
have explored "the death instinct," one of Freud's more controversial and mysterious postulates; philosophers such as Heidegger have pondered death's meaning; religions have formulated
tenets to deal with the problem of how to bear the end of life;
historians and anthropologists have studied death rituals-to
name only a few of the relevant disciplines. Science has not so
much pondered death as attacked it, transforming it, or attempting to, from "mysteries to be contemplated and deepened . . .
into problems to be solved."19
Perhaps because of the magnitude of this work and thought,
both Veatch and Colen have granted scant space to consideration
of two disciplines which have contributed most importantly to
our struggle to understand the meaning of death-psychology and
philosophy. It is beyond the scope of this review to try to remedy
that lack, but for the interested reader two major sources can be
recommended as starting places: Ernest Becker's remarkable
Pulitzer Prize-winning book, The Denial of Death,2 0 and the writings of Dr. Elizabeth Kubler-Ross, the best-known being her
18. J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859).
19. DEATH INSIDE OUT 5 (P. Steinfels & R. Veatch ed. 1975) (introduction by P. Steinfels, quoting P. Ramsey).
20. E. BECKER, THE DENIAL OF DEATH (1973).
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book, On Death and Dying.2'
One of Becker's central ideas seems particularly relevant in
that it suggests an explanation of some of our attitudes and actions in human dramas such as Karen Quinlan's. Becker argues
that the terror of death is universal and "a mainspring of human
activity-activity designed largely to avoid the fatality of death,
to overcome it by denying in some way that it is the final destiny
for man."2 This is alluded to in various places by both Veatch
and Colen. But Becker goes on to theorize that one of our major
human reflexes in the face of this terror is the urge to heroism.
Through heroic acts we can, if only temporarily, shake a fist at
fate, defy and deny the overwhelming terrors of the universe, and
claim victories to soften our despair at the inevitability of final
defeat and decay.
Becker's theory does seem to render more intelligible some of
the choices we make as a society. We will risk the lives of many
trained men to rescue the couple who have foolishly stranded
themselves on a mountaintop; follow intently the drama of an allout effort to rescue a handful of trapped miners, though we have
not made it a priority to remedy the working conditions which got
them there; spare no effort or expense to "save" a Karen Quinlan,
while somehow finding that the expense of providing adequate
health care services to the ghetto and the barrio can be spared.
Despite these reservations, the books by Colen and Veatch are
serious and thought-provoking. They persuasively make a case for
the importance of reexamining our attitudes towards death and
dying in the light of our new powers. Yet, after all is said and
done, it may be that choices about the meaning and manner of
one's own death, like numerous decisions made in life, will continue to be rooted more in personal character and style than in
reflections upon abstract analyses or legal theory. Two writers
quoted by Veatch and Colen serve as a fitting reminder of the
ultimately personal meaning of death, which each of us must face
alone, and reflect the diversity of individual stances possible before the prospect of death:
21. E. KUBLER-Ross, ON DEATH AND DYING (1969).
22. BECKER, supra note 20, at iv.
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A dying man needs to die, as a sleepy man needs to sleep, and
there comes a time when it is wrong, as well as useless, to resist.
Stewart Alsop, Stay of Execution3
Do not go gentle into that good night.
the dying of the light.

.

. Rage Rage against
Dylan Thomas 4

23. COLEN, supra note 1, at epigraph.
24. VEATCH, supra note 7, at 278.
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